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ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND
AND WIFE IN NEW YORK
William Tucker Dean*
I
INTRODUCTION
Among the profound changes that can be expected upon entering
matrimony are economic ones. These economic changes effected by mar-
riage may begin even before the ceremony with an antenuptial contract;
and after marriage, changes are possible with respect to the parties' rights
and powers over property. The right of the wife to separate property
may also come into question.
Property transactions between husband and wife may be subject to
special rules, especially if the relationship of agency is superimposed on
that of matrimony. Suits between husband and wife may be governed
by peculiar rules, and one spouse may be concerned over.liability to third
parties for the other spouse's transgressions. The obligations between
spouses for support both during cohabitation and after an alteration in
their marital status are very important. Succession to property after
death is significantly affected by marital status, and rights under pension
systems and workmen's compensation laws often turn on the claimant's
matrimonial status.
All of these economic relations between husband and wife are pre-
scribed by an intricate combination of statutes and decisions and while
many rules of law in this field may prevail in other states, New York
has its own unique combination of them all. It should be of interest,
therefore, to examine the law of these economic relations in New York
and then to venture some comment on the usefulness of the present rules.
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 241, for biographical data.
This study is adapted from: Dean, "Matrimonial Property Law in the State of New
York" in Matrimonial Property Law (University of Toronto School of Law, Comparative
Law Series, Vol. 2, ed. Prof. W. Friedmann, The Carswell Co., Toronto, 1955, pp. 315 ff.).
The author is indebted to the editor and publishers of that volume for permission to use
his contribution.
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Because New York is well ahead of many states in regulating these
economic relations between husband and wife, such an examination may
also serve as a standard by which to judge progress elsewhere.
The story begins with the first constitution of the State of New York,
adopted in 1777, which provided that:
S.. such parts of the common law of England, and the statute law of
England and Great-Britain, and of the acts of the legislature of the colony
of New York, as together did form the law of said colony on the nineteenth
day of April, in the year of our Lord, one thousand seven hundred and
seventy-five, shall be and continue the law of this state, subject to such
alterations and provisions as the legislature shall, from time to time, make
concerning the same.1
A further provision included in prevailing law the resolutions of the
congress of the colony and the convention of the State of New York to
the extent that they might be consistent with the constitution of 1777.
The two bodies, congress and convention, were the interim bodies that
operated between the end of British rule and the establishment of the
New York State Legislature under the first state constitution. No
reference was made, however, to judicial decisions under the colony,
congress, or convention.
This adoption of the common law and statute law of England as of
1775 reappeared in the succeeding constitutions2 and in substantially the
same terms in the present constitution adopted in 1938.
The method by which the equity jurisdiction and rules of the English
Chancellor were established in New York was somewhat different. The
constitution of 1777 provided, if somewhat indirectly, for a Chancellor to
exercise equity jurisdiction in addition to the jurisdiction exercised by
the judges of the supreme court, which was the common-law court of
general jurisdiction; 4 successive constitutions more precisely defined the
respective jurisdiction of the supreme court and the courts of equity, and
the present Civil Practice Act now provides:
The general jurisdiction in liw and equity which the supreme court of the
state possessed under the provisions of the constitution includes all the
jurisdiction which was possessed and exercised by the supreme court of the
colony of New York at any time and by the court of chancery in England
on the 4th day of July, 1776. .... 5
1 N.Y. Const. art. XXXV (1777).
2 N.Y. Const. art. VII, § 13 (1821); N.Y. Const. art. I, § 17 (1846); N.Y. Const. art. I,
§ 16 (1894).
3 N.Y. Const. art. I, § 14.
4 N.Y. Const. arts. XXIV, XXXII (1777).
5 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 64. See also, Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 284 (5th ed.
1941); Gould v. Gould, 118 Misc. 576, 195 N.Y. Supp. 113 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1922).
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It is necessary, therefore, to examine briefly the common law and
statutes as well as the rules of equity governing husband and wife in
England in 1775 and the authority to which to refer is, of course, Black-
stone's Commentaries on the Laws of England:"
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or
at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under
whose wing, protection and cover, she performs everything; and is there-
fore called in our law-french a feme-covert . . . and her condition during
her marriage is called her coverture. Upon this principle, of a union of
person in husband and wife, depend almost all the legal rights, duties and
disabilities, that either of them acquire by the marriage .... 7
From this common-law fiction of the unity of husband and wife flowed
the rules respecting relations between them. A husband could not grant
any property to his wife or contract with her, for that would simply be
a transaction with himself and therefore meaningless, and any contracts
they had entered into as the sole parties prior to the marriage were voided
by the marriage. Yet a man could bequeath property to his wife since
she would not acquire the property until she had become single again.
The husband was required to provide his wife with necessaries-food,
clothing, shelter, and so on-and, if he did not do so, any debts she con-
tracted for necessaries had to be paid by him. Should she leave him to
live with another man, his obligation to support her ceased. The respon-
sibility of the husband reached the point of making him liable for her
pre-marital debts. To obtain redress for an injury to her person or
property, suit had to be instituted in the names of both husband and wife
and in any civil action against her the husband had to be joined as co-
defendant. Only in ecclesiastical courts could a wife sue or be sued with-
out her husband. Under circumstances in which a married woman might
execute a deed, called a fine, for the transfer of real property, she had
to be examined privately by a judicial officer to ascertain whether she was
acting of her own free will or under her husband's coercion.
Other restrictions limited her individual liability for civil wrongs before
or during marriage and for most crimes. In Blackstone's words:
These are the chief legal effects of marriage during the coverture; upon
which we may observe, that even the disabilities which the wife lies under
are for the most part intended for her protection and benefit: so great a
favorite is the female sex of the laws of England.8
Such, briefly, were what Blackstone described as the personal relations
6 (1758). For an historical study see 3 Holdsworth, A History of English Law 185-97,
520-33, 550, 561 (5th ed. 1942).
7 1 Blackstone, Commentaries *442.
8 1 id. at *445.
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of husband and wife. In somewhat greater detail he also described the
property relations of husband and wife. Thus certain tenancies in real
property arose out of the marriage: there was the tenancy by the curtesy
of England, the estate of the husband in the real property left by his
wife if both he and issue capable of inheriting from her survived her
death; and then there was the tenancy in dower by which the wife re-
ceived at the death of her husband a one-third interest for her life in all
real property her husband had owned at any time during coverture.9 If
real property were conveyed to a husband and wife, they would hold it
under a unique tenancy, called a tenancy by the entirety; both were
owners of the entire estate, neither could convey it without the consent
of the other, and at the death of one the survivor succeeded to the entire
estate.'0
Although the husband obtained during the marriage only the income
from his wife's real estate, he became absolute owner of all of his wife's
personal property upon marriage as well as of any such property she
might receive during the marriage, and he could dispose of it as he alone
saw fit. The wife did have one species of personal property which she
owned at the death of her husband even though it had been her husband's;
that was her paraphernalia, her clothing and jewels.
Not only was a married woman incapable of making a will, but any
will she might have made before marriage was revoked by the marriage."
With the husband's consent, however, she could bequeath personal prop-
erty. Only by entering into an antenuptial contract in which the prospec-
tive husband and a third party on her behalf contracted to limit the
disabilities of coverture respecting property could the wife retain the
freedom to devise her personal property. 2
A husband had the right to recover damages for injuries to his wife,
whether they arose out of abduction, adultery, or physical abuse, but the
wife had no corresponding cause of action for injuries to her husband.' 3
It was the Chancellor, sitting for the King in the court of equity, to
whom married women in England owed their first steps toward emancipa-
tion in respect to property rights. Equity by 1775 had come to recognize
a gift of property to a woman, married or unmarried, as her separate
estate which the court of equity would protect against the common-law
claims of the husband. Where it was necessary for the husband to resort
to the court of chancery to reduce to his possession choses in action
9 2 id. at *126-39.
10 2 id. at *182.
11 2 id. at *433-36.
12 2 id. at *498.
13 3 id. at *139-40.
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owned by the wife, the doctrine of equity to a settlement imposed on the
husband the obligation of first making suitable provision for his wife
from such property.14
Such were the rules respecting marital property prevailing in England
in 1775 under the common law and the statute law as well as the rules of
equity on July 4, 1776. Since there has never been a comprehensive
codification of the law of marital property in New York, 5 the old English
rules lurk behind every legislative provision and each judicial decision
and they are frequently the standard by which the adequacy or propriety
of legislative and judge-made changes in the law are assessed. In the
more detailed discussion to follow, where the numerous statutory modifi-
cations of the original rules will be discussed, recurrence to the old
common law and equity will be necessary from time to time in order to
explain these modifications adequately.
That the changes came in the law as slowly as they did is to be won-
dered at and is not entirely explained by the frontier conditions in early
New York State as against Victorian England. Although in the Hudson
River Valley the land holdings of the Dutch patroons offered some parallel
to the feudal system in England in which the restrictions on the rights of
married women had their origin, yet the law did not change very rapidly
even as New York City became the center of population and the Mohawk
Valley became industrialized in part. The existing studies"8 do not satis-
factorily explain the lag in the law that often was more pronounced than
that in England. Much research remains to be done in this area not only
for New York but for the' other states as well.
II
EcONOmIC RELATIONS BEFORE MARRIAGE
At common law a single woman was free to contract just as a man was
but the effect of coverture upon her rights made it impossible to enforce
after marriage any contractual terms inconsistent with her marital status.
It was only after equity recognized the separate estate of a married
woman that a field was opened in which a contract before marriage could
14 Jenks, A Short History of English Law 222 et seq. (1912); Madden, Handbook of the
Law of Persons and Domestic Relations 99 et seq. (1931) (hereafter cited as Madden,
Domestic Relations).
15 The famous Field code of substantive law dealt with marital property but never
became law. See Field, et al., Ninth Report of the Commissioners of the Code (1865), and
David Dudley Field Centenary Essays (Reppy ed. 1949).
16 See, e.g., Calhoun, A Social History of the American Family (1945); Howard, A
History of Matrimonial Institutions (2d ed. 1904); Ironside, The Family in Colonial New
York (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Columbia Univ. 1942).
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be enforced after marriage and, after statutes granted to a greater or
lesser extent the right of a married woman to contract, the enforcement
of a contract of a woman made before marriage became relatively simple.
An antenuptial contract 7 is an agreement entered into between a single
man and a single woman respecting their property relationships after a
prospective marriage and occasionally respecting certain other matters. At
one time, especially under the earlier common law and equity, third parties
would also join in the contract; frequently they would be chosen from
the bride's family in order to protect her interests and to bring against the
husband any legal actions that might be necessary. The somewhat nar-
rower term, "marriage settlement," refers to an agreement, also in con-
templation of marriage, by which title to specific property, usually real
property, is to be changed. The term is not commonly used in New York
and with the greater concentration of wealth in personal property such as
stocks and bonds its scope is too limited to describe most agreements
before marriage.
To the extent that consideration is required for an antenuptial contract
it is said to be supplied by the marriage itself,' 8 which is another way of
saying that the primarily monetary consideration generally required for
contracts in Anglo-American law is not necessary.
The use of antenuptial contracts in New York appears to be limited to
persons of great wealth or else to those of recent European background.
The average citizen would seldom think of using this legal device.
Only the briefest legislation is found in New York to govern antenuptial
contracts:
A contract made between persons in contemplation of marriage, remains
in full force after the marriage takes place.19
17 The standard work is Lindey, Separation Agreements and Ante-Nuptial Contracts
(1937). Statutes of all the states on the subject are summarized in 3 Vernier, American
Family Laws § 15 (1935). A supplement to Vernier's five-volume work was published in
1938, but no further supplements have been published. In citations hereafter the supplement
will not be referred to specifically but should be consulted in each case. A recent statutory
summary in tabular form appears in Jacobs and Goebel, Cases and Other Materials on
Domestic Relations 1075-131 (3d ed. 1952). See also Madden, Domestic Relations 244, 246,
249; 1 Schouler, A Treatise on the Law of Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic
Relations (6th ed. 1921), the last comprehensive treatise on American family law (hereafter
cited as Schouler, Domestic Relations). Discussion of the New York law of antenuptial
contracts will be found in Battershall, The Law of Domestic Relations in the State of New
York 264 et seq. (1910) (hereafter cited as Battershal, Domestic Relations); Bullock, A
Treatise on the Law of Husband and Wife in New York §§ 57-75 (1897) (hereafter cited
as Bullock, Husband and Wife); Grossman, The New York Law of Domestic Relations
§ 100-17 (1947) (hereafter cited as Grossman, Domestic Relations).
18 Madden, Domestic Relations § 72; American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 166
N.E. 783 (1929).
19 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 53.
[Vol. 41
ECONOMIC RELATIONS
A husband who acquires property of his wife by antenuptial contract or
otherwise, is liable for her debts contracted before marriage, but only to the
extent of the property so acquired.20
If after making any will, such testator marries, and the husband or wife
survives the testator, such will shall be deemed revoked as to such survivor,
unless provision shall have been made for such survivor by an antenuptial
agreement in writing. . . .No evidence to rebut such presumption of
revocation shall be received, except to show the existence of such ante-
nuptial agreement.2 '
There is also a requirement that except for mutual promises to marry a
contract made in consideration of marriage must be in writing. 2 On this
meager foundation the New York courts have erected a superstructure of
case law, defining and regulating contracts in contemplation of marriage.
The purpose of antenuptial contracts has been the guiding principle for
courts: to protect the property interests of the parties, especially those of
the wife, by making different provisions from those the law would other-
wise establish after marriage. If the wife be wealthy, the antenuptial
contract may be directed at protecting her wealth from the demands her
husband might make on it after marriage. Or a prospective husband with
property he wishes to preserve intact, whether it be an ancestral home or
a closely held corporation, may provide for his wife under an antenuptial
contract so that his death will not permit her to force the sale of such
assets.
In general the law of contracts covers this particular variety of con-
tract; the matter of consideration has already been mentioned. To.
construe an ambiguous contract the courts will examine the position of
the contracting parties and the circumstances under which the contract
was negotiated. The intention of the parties carries great weight and
because the parties are not dealing commercially there is more scope for
liberal construction than in business contracts. The wife is entitled to the
benefit of any doubtful provisions, reflecting Blackstone's characterization
of her as a favorite of the law. Both parties, of course, must have capacity
to contract generally, and thus must be of age and sound mind.
The most important difference between ordinary contracts and antenup-
tial contracts is in the requirement of fairness to the wife. The parties are
not considered to be dealing at arms' length as commercial contracting
parties do. If the woman, for example, accepts in an antenuptial contract
a smaller interest in her prospective husband's property than she would
otherwise be entitled to claim if she should survive him, he must disclose
20 Id. § 54.
21 N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 35. This provision will be discussed below in connection with
rights of succession.
22 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 31(3), 51.
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to her the extent of his wealth and the provision he makes for her in lieu
of her widow's share in the estate must be reasonable in relation to his
wealth and the situation of the parties.
Another peculiarity of antenuptial contracts is that each party at the
time of making must have capacity not only to contract generally, as has
been mentioned, but also capacity to marry. If one of the parties, for
example, is married to a third person when the contract is made, it will be
invalid because of the lack of capacity to marry at the time of contracting
as well as because of the public policy against what is essentially a con-
tract to obtain a divorce.
Obviously, the husband may not use the device of an antenuptial con-
tract to avoid his obligation to support his wife.
Before the substitution in New York of the spouse's elective share for
curtesy and dower, the antenuptial agreement was frequently used as a
method of obtaining a release in advance of the widow's dower interest.
Now it is used to obtain a release of the widow's elective share by making
a different but reasonable provision for her. One commonly used method
is to establish a trust in favor of the wife with the income payable to her
only after marriage or else after the death of the husband.
The requirement that an antenuptial contract be in writing is found in
section 31(3) of the New York Personal Property Law,23 which is the
New York version of the English Statute of Frauds. This requirement is
met without any necessity for a formal document or affidavit; anything in
writing, be it a series of letters or a bare memorandum, will suffice if the
terms of the agreement are set out. Marriage after an oral antenuptial
agreement will not cure the defect; the agreement will be unenforceable.
Only where the antenuptial agreement is intended to be a release of the
spouse's elective share in the estate of the deceased spouse is there a rigid,
formal requirement; such a release must be signed at the end by the one
giving the release and the document must be acknowledged or proved like
a deed for real estate.
Ordinarily the husband bears the burden of proving the validity of an
antenuptial agreement on the possibly doubtful assumption that he is the
stronger of the two parties, but New York courts will inquire into the
circumstances of the parties and in a given case may decide that the
woman was in the dominant position and should bear the burden herself.
Not only may the parties to the antenuptial agreement enforce it, so also
may any third-party beneficiary of the agreement who seeks to establish
his rights.
It has already been pointed out that usually an antenuptial contract
23 See Matter of Goldberg, 275 N.Y. 186, 9 N.E.2d 829 (1937).
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will be limited to the property relationships of the prospective spouses.
Recently a New York court enforced an antenuptial contract whereby the
offspring of the proposed union were to be brought up as Catholics. 4
The effect of an executed antenuptial contract on the creditors of the
party granting property to the other spouse is illustrated in a case decided
by the Court of Appeals.25 Pursuant to an antenuptial contract the
husband gave his wife jewelry and real property. Soon after, he was
exposed as an embezzler and the surety on his fidelity bond sued the wife,
who in the meantime had obtained an annulment for fraud, to regain the
jewelry and real estate or their value. The court observed that the former
husband could not have obtained the return of the property because he
had been guilty of fraud in inducing the wife to marry him, and that the
property bestowed was not itself taken from the employer or obtained by
a fraud on the creditors at the time it was given. The surety company,
therefore, obtained nothing, whether as a claimant of specific property or
as a creditor of the husband.
In conclusion a word might be said about the impact on antenuptial
agreements of the abolition in New York of actions for breach of promise
to marry.5 In spite of the strong language of the abolishing statute it
seems certain that where a valid antenuptial contract had been made and
property transferred pursuant to the contract but prior to the marriage,
a wrongful refusal to marry by the party receiving the property would
not prevent restitution of the property for failure of the consideration. 27
This is apparent when it is realized that one reason for abolishing the
cause of action was its abuse by persons who lacked any reliable docu-
mentary evidence of an agreement to marry.
III
MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY RELATIONS28
As one of the majority of the states in the common-law tradition, New
York has a system recognizing separate as against community property
for husband and wife. Legislation has abolished the common-law limita-
tions on the property rights of the wife in these terms:
24 Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S.2d 100 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. Richmond County 1942)
(not officially reported).
25 American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 166 N.E. 783 (1929).
26 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act art. 2-A.
27 Zawadzki v. Vandetti, 255 App. Div. 932, 9 N.Y.S.2d 219 (4th Dep't 1938).
28 The law in all of the states is summarized in Long, A Treatise on Domestic Relations
c. IX (3d ed. 1923) (hereafter cited as Long, Domestic Relations); Madden, Domestic
Relations c. 4; Peck, The Law of Persons and Domestic Relations cs. XI-XIII, XVI (3d
ed. 1930) (hereafter cited as Peck, Domestic Relations); Schouler, Domestic Relations
cs. X, XI, XV, XVI; 3 Vernier, American Family Laws §§ 167, 176. The New York
law is described in Battershall, Domestic Relations c. X; Bullock, Husband and Wife c. VI;
Grossman, Domestic Relations c. X.
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Property, real or personal, now owned by a married woman, or hereafter
owned by a married woman at the time of her marriage, or acquired by
her as prescribed in this chapter, and the rents, issues, proceeds and profits
thereof, shall continue to be her sole and separate property as if she were
unmarried, and shall not be subject to her husband's control or disposal nor
liable for his debts. 29
It is permissible in New York, as in all other states, to treat the income
of the husband as the joint income of husband and wife for state30 and fed-
eral31 income tax purposes, but for other purposes the income and prop-
erty of each spouse belong to that spouse alone.
There is in New York, as in more than half of the other states,32 a
curious anachronism surviving from before Blackstone's time, the estate
by the entirety. The common-law incidents of this estate already have
been described, and for the most part it is the common-law estate by the
entirety which still flourishes in New York although the occasion for this
estate, the common-law unity of husband and wife, has long since disap-
peared.33 A recent statutory change granted to courts hearing matri-
monial actions the power to determine the occupancy of premises held by
the entirety.3 4 Since consent of both tenants is required for termination
of the estate, husbands and wives litigating over their matrimonial status
have not always been able to agree on occupancy, and heretofore the
courts have been powerless to interfere.
The tenancy by the entirety is not available with respect to person-
alty,35 but husband and wife may own personal property as joint tenants"
or tenants in common.37
If a husband and wife by contract agree that they shall treat their re-
spective separate incomes and property as joint rather than separate, or
in other respects vary their property relationships, that is permissible in
New York. Only when such an agreement is a device whereby, for
example, a husband attempts to avoid such responsibility as that for
support does the law step in and deny any effect to such a contract on the
ground of public policy.3"
29 N.Y. Doam. Rel. Law § 50.
30 N.Y. Tax Law § 367(1).
31 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 12(d).
32 See 2 American Law of Property § 6.6 (Casner ed. 1952).
33 See Note, "Tenancies by the Entirety in New York," 1 Buffalo L. Rev. 279 (1952).
34 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1164-a. See the study by the present writer, N.Y. Leg. Doc.
No. 65(L) (1953).
35 West v. McCullough, 123 App. Div. 846, 108 N.Y. Supp. 493 (2d Dep't 1908), aff'd,
194 N.Y. 518, 87 N.E. 1130 (1909).
36 Matter of Russell, 168 N.Y. 169, 61 N.E. 166 (1901).
37 Matter of Kaupper, 141 App. Div. 54, 125 N.Y. Supp. 878 (2d Dep't 1910), aff'd,
201 N.Y. 534, 94 N.E. 1095 (1911).
38 N.Y. Doam. Rel. Law § 51.
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As in many other states, 9 New York has statutory provisions appar-
ently directed toward protecting the family home. "Apparently" is used
because the exemptions from the claims of creditors are limited to "a lot
of land, with one or more buildings thereon, not exceeding in value one
thousand dollars," 40 or the first $1000 obtained after execution and sale
of a homestead worth more than $1000, 41 a paltry amount in view of the
present dollar values of homes. It is necessary for the property to have
been designated as homestead property either by a conveyance describing
it as such or by a similar recorded instrument.42 Not only is the exemp-
tion available to a householder, usually considered a male, but also to a
woman, married or single.43 Upon the death of the owner of the home-
stead, the exemption continues until the majority of the youngest child
of the owner of the property and the death of the surviving spouse of the
owner.44 It appears that homestead property can be mortgaged and con-
veyed by the owner without action by the other spouse.4 5
Similar provisions protect such articles of personal property as a wed-
ding ring, mechanic's tools, etc. of specified value when owned either by a
householder or non-householder. 46 No rights of spouses in such personalty
as between themselves are covered by these statutes.
1. Rights With Respect to Each Other's Property
Section 50 of the Domestic Relations Law, already quoted,47 establishes
the exclusive right of the wife to her property owned at the time of
marriage or acquired later, and section 60 extends to the married woman
the power to bring her own action for wages earned. The husband is
therefore barred from his common-law ownership of her personal prop-
erty, his former right to her wages, and his former control of her real
property. New York has gone farther than a number of other states48 in
thus treating the property of both husband and wife as separate property
89 See 3 Vernier, American Family Laws § 225.
40 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 671.
41 Id. 1 676.
42 Id. § 672.
43 Id. 1 673.
44 Id. 1 674.
45 Id. § 678, describing the procedure for cancellation of exemption of homestead property,
concludes: "... nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to prevent the husband
and wife from jointly conveying or mortgaging property, so exempt." This seems to have
been misconstrued to require the concurrence of husband and wife in such mortgage or
conveyance even though only one party is the owner. 3 Vernier, American Family Laws
8 225. No New York cases applying this provision have been found.
46 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act 88 665-66.
47 See note 29 supra.
48 See 3 Vernier, American Family Laws § 167-76.
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unaffected during the lifetime of the parties by the marriage relationship.
Such property relationships after the death of one spouse will be discussed
below under "Succession."
If spouses hold property jointly, other than by a tenancy by the en-
tirety, an action for partition may be brought by one spouse against the
other. If they are living on the premises as man and wife, the owner may
not, however, oust the other spouse,4 9 since a successful ouster would
amount to a separation of the parties, which can only be decreed in
accordance with statutes prescribing matrimonial actions.
The legislation regulating small loan operations has a provision which
grants a kind of joint interest in the property and income of a family.
If a lender in the business of making loans of $500 or less obtains an
assignment of wages or any kind of lien on the household furniture, it will
not be valid ". . .. if the borrower is married unless it is signed in person
by both husband and wife, provided that written assent of a spouse shall
not be required when husband and wife have been living separate and
apart for a period of at least five months. . . 2"' The law is designed to
protect wage-earners from the rapacity of some persons in the small loan
business and does not give to one spouse any interest in furniture owned
by the other or in wages earned by the other except with respect to the
necessity of consent before either may be assigned or otherwise pledged.
The rights of creditors against the property of husbands and wives,
except as such property may be homestead property, was discussed
previously.
Separate Property of the Wife
New York has firmly established the right of a married woman to the
ownership and control of her own property,51 and New York has specified
in some detail her powers:
A married woman has all the rights in respect to property, real or per-
sonal, and the acquisition, use, enjoyment and disposition thereof, and to
make contracts in respect thereto with any person . . . as if she were un-
married. .. . Judgment for or against a married woman, may be rendered
and enforced ...as if she was [sic] single. A married woman may confess a
judgment .... 52
A person who holds property as trustee of a married woman, under a
deed of conveyance or otherwise, may, on the written request of such mar-
ried woman, accompanied by a certificate of a justice of the supreme court,
49 Marshall v. Marshall, 116 Misc. 249, 190 N.Y. Supp. 318 (Dutchess County Ct. 1921);
Cipperly v. Cipperly, 104 Misc. 434, 172 N.Y. Supp. 351 (Rensselaer County Ct. 1918).
50 N.Y. Bank. Law § 356.
51 N.Y. Doam. Rel. Law § 50.
52 Id. § 51.
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that he has examined the condition and situation of the property, and made
inquiry .into the capacity of such married woman to manage and control
the same, convey to such married woman all or any portion of such prop-
erty, or the rents, issues or profits thereof.53
The latter of these two statutes, in spite of its broad language, is taken
to refer only to the archaic type of trust once used in order to assure a
woman of her separate estate apart from her husband, a purpose for which
no occasion now exists.
Married women are included by unmistakable implication in the
category of "all persons, except idiots, persons of unsound mind and
infants . . . who may devise property, real and personal,55 and who
may own and transfer real property.5" The legislature has dealt specifi-
cally with the grant of powers to married women:
A general and beneficial power may be given to a married woman, to
dispose, during her marriage, and without concurrence of her husband, of
real property conveyed or devised to her in fee.57
A special and beneficial power may be granted,
1. To a married woman, to dispose, during the marriage, and without the
concurrence of her husband, of any estate less than a fee, belonging to her,
in the property to which the power relates.58
Other legislation specifies that:
The acknowledgment or proof of a conveyance of real property, within
the state, or of any other written instrument, may be made by a married
woman same [ski] as if unmarried.59
A series of cases has defined what constitutes property acquired by
the wife which becomes her separate property. Money or its proceeds
received from her husband for household expenses, for example, will not
become her separate property, but she may receive gifts from her hus-
band, as will be discussed below.
In summary it may be said that the old doctrines of the separate estate
of the married woman are no longer applicable in New York; her rights
with respect to her own property are the same as those of any other
person.
It is obvious that a considerable number of married women are engaged
in business in New York, most of them as employees, it is true, but a
53 Id. § 59.
54 N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 10.
55 Id. § 15.
56 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 11.
57 Id. § 142.
58 Id. § 143.
59 Id. § 302.
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number of them as entrepreneurs and often successful ones. The laws of
New York fully protect their right so to engage in business by the broad
terms of section 51 of the Domestic Relations Law:
A married woman has all the rights . . . to carry on any business, trade
or occupation, and to exercise all powers and enjoy all rights in respect
thereto and in respect to her contracts, and be liable on such contracts as
if she were unmarried. ....
The right of a married woman to bring her own cause of action for
wages or other compensation is protected by legislation. Only if the
husband and wife have agreed that the husband may bring the action-
and the presumption is that no such agreement has been made-may the
husband sue for the wife's compensation.10
Such problems as arise when the wife is in business as either a partner
or agent of her husband will be discussed below.61 Unfortunately not all
of the states give a married woman untrammeled freedom to carry on a
business; a number of them have various remnants of common-law
restrictions. 62
Transactions Between Husband and Wife
The change in the status of married women has eliminated most of the
special rules that used to regulate gifts"3 between husband and wife. In
general, if the legal requirements for a gift are complied with-donative
intent, transfer of possession or its equivalent, and acceptance-the prop-
erty in the article will pass just as if the parties to the transaction were
not married. 4
Because of the unusually intimate relationship of husband and wife
there are some circumstances where a gift from one to the other may be
subject to special rules. For example, when one spouse buys property in
the name of the other without any expression of intent, a gift will be
implied65 although if the parties were not husband and wife no gift would
result under the circumstances. Similarly, property purchased by one
60 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 60.
61 For the disabilities formerly attaching to a married woman in business in New York
see Battershall, Domestic Relations 287 et seq.; Bullock, Husband and Wife c. VII. See also
Grossman, Domestic Relations 88 279-81.
62 See 3 Vernier, American Family Laws J 187, for a summary of the statutes. See
also Long, Domestic Relations §§ 138, 175; Madden, Domestic Relations § 63; Peck,
Domestic Relations 88 72, 83, 116-18; Schouler, Domestic Relations c. XVII.
63 See Battershall, Domestic Relations 271 et seq.; Bullock, Husband and Wife 150 et
seq.; Grossman, Domestic Relations c. XII.
64 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 56.
65 Weigert v. Schlesinger, 150 App. Div. 765, 135 N.Y. Supp. 335 (2d Dep't 1912), aff'd,
210 N.Y. 573, 104 N.E. 1143 (1914).
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spouse in the names of both of them will pass after the death of the
purchaser to the surviving spouse by implied gift.66
There has been considerable litigation in New York with respect to
joint bank accounts, and in many cases the joint depositors have been
husband and wife. Section 239 of the Banking Law makes all such de-
posits in savings banks, whether by a spouse or anyone else, the property
of both parties named as depositors with a right of survivorship giving the
entire deposit to the survivor. 7 Where a deposit is made in a commercial
bank by one party in the name of the depositor and another, there is
merely a presumption of joint ownership, again without limitation to
spouses.""
Although the fact that the parties to a gift transaction are husband and
wife does not itself give rise to any presumption of fraud, the courts
scrutinize closely a gift by one spouse to another which results in the
insolvency of the donor, and unless a positive showing of good faith can
be made such a gift will be set aside as fraudulent. While the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, enacted in New York by article 10 of the
Debtor and Creditor Law, does not specifically refer to transfers between
spouses, section 273 renders fraudulent every conveyance and obligation
incurred by one who is thereby made insolvent if there is no consideration.
This section has been applied to render void conveyances by husbands to
wives where the wife was unable to establish that she gave consideration69
and where the transaction was intended to be a gift7 °
In the field of bankruptcy, although the Constitution of the United
States grants to Congress the power to make uniform laws on bank-
ruptcy,71 Congress has made the state law test of fraud applicable in any
transaction by the bankrupt,"' so that the New York law just discussed
governs New York transactions in bankruptcy cases in the federal courts.
Special attention has been given by the New York Legislature to life
insurance as between spouses. A married woman by section 52 of the
Domestic Relations Law is specifically authorized to insure her husband's
life in her own name or in that of a third person as her trustee. A section
66 Wegmann v. Kress, 152 App. Div. 937, 137 N.Y. Supp. 1148 (3d Dep't 1912), aff'd,
208 N.Y. 622, 102 N.E. 1117 (1913).
67 The courts have nevertheless construed the clear words of the statute as establishing
no more than a presumption of joint ownership, rebuttable during the lifetime of the parties
(Glaser v. Glaser, 37 N.Y.S.2d 477 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County), aff'd, 264 App. Div. 884,
36 N.Y.S.2d 878 (2d Dep't 1942)) but conclusive thereafter.
68 Inda v. Inda, 288 N.Y. 315, 43 N.E.2d 59 (1942).
69 Banister v. Solomon, 126 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1942).
70 Rudin v. Steinbugler, 103 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1938).
71 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
72 52 Stat. 875 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1952).
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of the Insurance Law gives the right to the husband as well. 3 In the case
of the wife who takes out insurance, if the proceeds of the policy are paid
to her, she receives them free of any claim by her husband's creditors or
personal representative. If the husband's money is used to pay for the
policy, however, she may keep free of such claims only that portion of the
proceeds purchased by a premium of $500 a year. The policy may be
payable to the husband or to the children of the couple, if the wife pre-
deceases him, or she can dispose of it by will or by formal assignment to
take effect on her death, if she leaves no descendants. Furthermore, any
life insurance policy of which a married woman is the beneficiary may be
assigned and it may be surrendered with the consent of the person
insured.74
A subsequently enacted provision of the Insurance Law,75 dealing with
exemptions of insurance proceeds generally, was held to have repealed the
$500 exemption clause of section 52 of the Domestic Relations Law by
implication. Section 52 is still applicable to insurance policies issued
before March 31, 1927, the effective date of the implied repealer.7 As for
insurance policies issued in favor of the wife after that date, the wife gets
the entire proceeds free from claims both of her husband's and her own
creditors unless actual fraud on the creditors can be proved.
Section 166 (3) of the Insurance Law, granting as to annuity benefits
a $400 monthly exemption from creditors' claims, impliedly protects a
wife or dependent husband of an annuitant by giving the court discretion
as to how much creditors may take over the $400 exemption ". . . after
due regard for the reasonable requirements of the judgment debtor and
his family. '77
The policy which this legislation expresses is to give the wife for her
own protection an insurable interest in her husband's life free from
creditors' claims, provided only that fraud is not practiced. The rules
apply as well to policies taken out by a husband and payable to the wife.
A wife can acquire a vested interest even in a policy taken out by her
husband if she shares in the payment of premiums. 7 An irrevocable
designation of the wife as beneficiary of her husband's policy makes her
consent necessary before a loan may be obtained on the policy.79
73 N.Y. Ins. Law § 146(3).
74 N.Y. Doam. Rel. Law § 52. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 15, making life insurance proceeds
and certain other personal property unassignable, expressly exempts the rights of creditors
granted in § 52 of the Dom. Rel. Law.
75 N.Y. Ins. Law § 166.
76 Holmes v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 288 N.Y. 106, 41 N.E. 909 (1942).
77 Anderson v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 261 N.Y. 450, 185 N.E. 696 (1933).
78 Re Wainman, 121 Misc. 318, 200 N.Y. Supp. 893 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1923).
79 Levy v. Commissioner, 65 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1933). See also N.Y. Ins. Law § 101.
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Mention has already been made of the broad powers a married woman
possesses in New York to convey property of all kinds to her husband as
a gift. Specific legislation, in effect supplementary to the statutes already
discussed, is broad enough to cover all transfers between spouses:
Husband and wife may convey or transfer real or personal property directly,
the one to the other, without the intervention of a third person; and may
make partition or division of any real property held by them as tenants in
common, joint tenants or tenants by the entireties.8 0
This provision was designed to lay at rest the old common-law rules
limiting transactions, especially conveyances of real property, between
husband and wife and later permitting such transactions through a third
party as a dummy.81
There are wide variations among the other states in the extent to which
the husband and wife are free of common-law restrictions in their trans-
actions with each other. While no state retains all of the old limitations,
many still have at least some of them."2
The only remaining restriction on contractual relations between hus-
band and wife is found in section 51 of the Domestic Relations Law
where, after stating the plenary powers of a married woman to contract
with anyone, including her husband, it goes on: ". . . but a husband and
wife cannot contract to alter or dissolve the marriage or to relieve the
husband from liability to support his wife."
Other property transactions between husband and wife are examined
elsewhere in this paper.
Agency of Husband and Wife 3
The broad powers of husbands and wives to transact business with
each other, which has been described in the preceding pages, permit either
spouse to enter into a principal-agent relationship with the other in New
York. The legal problems presently arising from husband-and-wife
agency relationships are principally those of taxation, federal taxation for
the most part, those of the scope of authority of agents, and problems
where the agency relationship is implied.
As for taxation it is federal income taxation which is, of course, of the
greatest financial significance, and the federal tax authorities are free to
make their own determination of legal relationships as they affect tax
80 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 56.
81 See 3 Vernier, American Family Laws § 182.
82 Id. §§ 155, 156, 182, 225.
83 On New York law see Battershall, Domestic Relations 297 et seq.; Bullock, Husband
and Wife §§ 233-35; Grossman, Domestic Relations §§ 265-69, 329-31, 368. For the law
generally see Long, Domestic Relations §§ 154-56; Madden, Domestic Relations §§ 59, 60;
Peck, Domestic Relations §1 77, 87; Schouler, Domestic Relations § 93, 135-44.
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liability. It is possible to summarize national as against merely New York
rules with respect to tax consequences of husband-and-wife agencies.84
The principal objective, tax-wise, in establishing a husband-and-wife
agency formerly was to split the income of the husband by creating a
partnership in which the wife would be designated as receiving half of the
husband's income, thus placing them in a lower tax bracket than if the
husband's entire income were attributed to him. Since it is now permis-
sible, even in separate property states such as New York, for spouses to
file joint federal income tax returns, much of the attraction of this variety
of family partnership has been lost. Other tax advantages may still be
obtainable, however, where other members of the family join the partner-
ship or where the family partnership is one element in a complex of
tax avoidance devices. 85
As to the scope of authority of one spouse acting as agent for the other,
the trend of the cases is to treat such agency relationships exactly like an
agency between strangers. 8 Despite the appearance of a broad agency
where the wife, for example, is active in her husband's business, her
authority to act for him in a given transaction must be clearly shown.
Although it might be argued that an agency relationship implied by law
cannot accurately be described as one of agency, because it lacks the
voluntary character of a true agency, nevertheless it has become custom-
ary to describe the power of the wife to bind her husband for the purchase
of necessaries as that of an implied agent. The rule, which essentially
gives a needy wife the power to hawk a lawsuit among merchants, makes
a husband, who wrongfully neglects to support his wife, liable to persons
who furnish her with necessaries, these being interpreted by the courts as
such services and commodities as are appropriate to the income and
station in life of the parties. New York recognizes the common-law cause
of action for necessaries,7 but much of the more recent litigation seems to
have involved efforts by merchants to make husbands pay for lavish
credit inadvertently extended to wives on bad terms with them.88 As will
be explained below, more modern devices are now available for the
genuinely neglected wife.
The New York courts have accepted the implied agency of the wife to
84 Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
85 For a discussion of the tax cases see 6 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 35.09-
35.09g (Henderson ed. 1949).
86 See Mechem, Outlines of Agency c. IX (3d ed. 1923); Tiffany, Handbook of the Law
of Principal and Agent cs. III, IV (Powell ed. 1924).
87 Wanamaker v. Weaver, 176 N.Y. 75, 68 N.E. 135 (1903).
88 See, e.g., Bloomingdale Bros. v. Benjamin, 200 Misc. 1108, 112 N.Y.S.2d 33 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1951) (caviar and whalemeat held necessaries).
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purchase food for her husband and do not require proof in each case that
the particular purchase of food, for example, was actually authorized by
the husband. 9 A few states have gone farther and simply omit the re-
quirement of privity of contract from an action for breach of warranty. °
The Uniform Commercial Code, now under study by the New York State
Law Revision Commission, provides that:
A seller's warranty . . . extends to any natural person who is in the family
or household of his buyer . . . if it is reasonable to expect that such
person may use, consume or be affected by the goods....91
The only legislation in New York dealing with husband-and-wife agen-
cies is the law defining mechanic's liens, which provides for a lien on real
property in favor of one hired to improve it:
Where the contract for an improvement is made with a husband or wife
and the property belongs to the other or both, the husband or wife contract-
ing shall also be presumed to be the agent of the other, unless such other
having knowledge of the improvement shall, within ten days after learning
of the contract give to the contractor written notice of his or her refusal
to consent to the improvement.92
2. Economic Litigation Between Husband and Wife
Modem statutes in New York have swept away the common-law
effluvia limiting suits between spouses,93 remnants of which persist in
other states as they did in New York' for many years. This was accom-
plished by the terms of the Domestic Relations Law:
A married woman has a right of action against her husband for his wrong-
ful or tortious acts resulting to her in any personal injury . . . or resulting
in injury to her property, as if they were unmarried, and she is liable to
her husband . . . [similarly].95
A married woman has all the rights . . . to make contracts . . . with
any person, including her husband . . . and be liable on such contracts,
as if she were unmarried. . .. 9
If the inter-spousal action is for damages for injuries or wrongful death
suffered in a motor vehicle accident, the negligent spouse's insurer, how-
ever, will not be liable unless such liability to a spouse has been expressly
89 Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
90 See Dickerson, Products Liability and the Food Consumer 63 et seq. (1951).
91 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318 (Official Draft 1952).
92 N.Y. Lien Law § 3.
93 See Long, Domestic Relations §§ 157, 158; Madden, Domestic Relations § 69; Peck,
Domestic Relations § 89; Schouler, Domestic Relations §§ 54, 627-39; 3 Vernier, American
Family Laws § 180.
94 See Battershall, Domestic Relations 310, 316; Bullock, Husband and Wife c. XIX;
Grossman, Domestic Relations §§ 245-55.
95 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 57.
96 Id. § 51.
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assumed in the policy.97 This legislation was sponsored by the liability
insurance companies, alarmed over the opportunities for fraud by collu-
sion between husbands and wives in automobile cases.
A single relic of the common-law bar to tort actions between spouses
persists in New York, however. A communication from one spouse to
another will not be treated as the publication of a libel to a third person
because of the peculiarly intimate relationship of husband and wife.9 8
Mention has already been made of the statute authorizing partition or
division of real property held by spouses in any form of tenancy, 9 which
includes the power to bring a cause of action to compel partition. Of
course, in the case of property held by the entirety, partition other than
by mutual consent can only be effected after a dissolution of the marriage
although it is now possible for a court hearing a matrimonial action to
make directions as to the occupancy of such property.10 0
3. Actions by Third Parties Against Husband and Wife'0 '
All of the old common-law limitations on the liability of a married
woman to third parties in contract have been eliminated in New York by
the forthright words of the statute: 1 2
A married woman has all the rights in respect to property, real or personal,
and the acquisition, use, enjoyment and disposition thereof, and to make
contracts in respect thereto with any person . . . and to carry on any busi-
ness, trade or occupation, and to exercise all powers and enjoy all rights
in respect thereto and in respect to her contracts, and be liable on such
contracts as if she were unmarried. . . . Judgment for or against a married
woman, may be rendered and enforced, in a court of record, or not of record,
as if she was [sic] single. A married woman may confess a judgment .... 10 3
With the exception of the husband's liability to third persons for neces-
saries furnished to the wife, which has already been discussed,' 4 and the
spouse's statutory liability to the public authorities who have supported
97 N.Y. Ins. Law § 167(3); N.Y. Vehicle & T. Law § 59(2).
98 Lawler v. Merritt, 182 Misc. 648, 48 N.Y.S2d 843 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1944),
aff'd, 269 App. Div. 662, 53 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1st Dep't 1945).
99 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 56.
100 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1164-a.
101 The common law rules and the varying degrees of their modification in other-states
are discussed in Long, Domestic Relations c. XIII; Madden, Domestic Relations §2 35,
39-41, 47, 48, 54, 63; Peck, Domestic Relations 22 82-84, 87, 90; Schouler, Domestic Rela-
tions cs. VI, XHI, XIII, XX, XXI, XXII; 3 Vernier, American Family Laws §§ 151-54,
159, 160, 183-85, 224, 225.
102 The New York rules are discussed in Battershall, Domestic Relations 279 et seq.;
Bullock, Husband and Wife cs. VI, VII, VIII, IX; Grossman, Domestic Relations §§ 279-81,
326.
103 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 51.
104 See note 87 supra.
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an indigent or sick spouse, which will be discussed below, the husband is
not liable in New York for the wife's contractual or quasi-contractual
obligations either before or after marriage except where he has acquired
liability under the general law of contracts quite aside from the marital
relationship of the parties. Two statutes make this clear:
A contract made by a married woman does not bind her husband or his
property.'0 5
A husband who acquires property of his wife by ante-nuptial contract or
otherwise, is liable for her debts contracted before marriage, but only to
the extent of the property so acquired. 06
Section 50 of the Domestic Relations Law, already mentioned,'07 pro-
tects the wife's separate property from any liability under her husband's
contracts, although she does retain liability to the public authorities under
circumstances to be discussed below.
It has already been pointed out that the married woman has her own
cause of action for wages and other compensation due to her.0 8
Just as in the field of contracts, the emancipation of the married woman
has brought to an end in New York the ancient distinctions with respect
to the liability of the husband for the torts of his wife.0 9 Since the wife
was not liable at common law for the torts of her husband, no change has
been necessary on that matter. The statute provides:
A married woman has a right of action for an injury to her person, property
or character or for an injury arising out of the marital relation, as if un-
married. She is liable for her wrongful or tortious acts; her husband is not
liable for such acts, unless they were done by his actual coercion or instiga-
tion; and such coercion or instigation shall not be presumed, but must be
proved .... 110
The spouse of a decedent is included with the next-of-kin as a person
permitted to bring a wrongful death action in New York,"' and a spouse
can be sued as legatee to enforce liability for a decedent's debt." 2
Not only is the liability of a married woman in both tort and contract
105 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 55.
106 Id. § 54.
107 See note 29 supra.
108 See note 60 supra.
109 The common law rules and their survival in other states are discussed in Long,
Domestic Relations c. XIV; Madden, Domestic Relations §§ 64-67; Peck, Domestic Relations
§§ 86, 88, 89B, 90; Schouler, Domestic Relations cs. VIII, XVI; 3 Vernier, American Family
Law § 157. For the New York Law see Battershall, Domestic Relations 311 et seq.;
Bullock, Husband and Wife c. XV; Grossman, Domestic Relations §§ 174-76.
110 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 57.
111 N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 130.
112 Id. §§ 170, 183, 188.
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clearly established, but her capacity as an individual party has been made
plain:
A married woman may be a party in the same manner as if she were single.
Her husband is not a necessary or proper party solely because of his rela-
tionship as such husband." 3
4. Liability Between Spouses for Support
Liability Without Change in Marital Status
New York," 4 like all of the states," 5 requires a husband to support his
wife during the marriage. So stringent is this requirement that the legis-
lature has forbidden any contract between husband and wife to relieve
the husband from this responsibility." 6 The fact that the wife has suffi-
cient property of her own to support her does not alter the obligation of
the husband."17
The obligation to support the wife is principally statutory in New York
and the statutes are scattered confusingly and illogically in the Civil'
Practice Act, in various of the Consolidated Laws, and in the Unconsoli-
dated Laws. The husband's obligation to support is not uniformly deter-
mined throughout the state and its enforcement must be sought sometimes
in a variety of courts, some of them peculiar to only certain portions of
the state.
The only limitation on this broad duty to support is that the wife, in
order to receive the support, must cohabit with the husband and avoid
such misconduct as would constitute grounds for a divorce or separation
by the husband, and even where the wife's conduct is thus reprehensible
the husband will still be responsible to the extent necessary to prevent her
from becoming a public charge."8 Of course, if the wife ceases to cohabit
with the husband because of his misconduct, his obligation to support her
continues.
The obligation to support as it is enforced without effecting any change
in matrimonial status will first be considered, and maintenance in connec-
tion with matrimonial actions will then be discussed.
113 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 200.
114 See Battershall, Domestic Relations 277 et seq.; Bullock, Husband and Wife c. XIV;
Grossman, Domestic Relations §§ 136-54, 177-219.
115 See Keezer, The Law of Marriage and Divorce §§ 261, 270-92 (3d ed. 1946); Long,
Domestic Relations §§ 106-09; Madden, Domestic Relations §§ 58, 61, 62; 1 Nelson, Divorce
and Annulment c. 13 (2d ed. 1945); 3 id. c. 32; Peck, Domestic Relations § 78-81;
Schouler, Domestic Relations §§ 45, 46, 54, 83-121.
116 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 51.
117 Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Gray, 278 N.Y. 380, 16 N.E.2d 373 (1938).
118 People v. Schenkel, 258 N.Y. 224, 179 N.E. 474 (1932).
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What might be termed the minimal requirement for support of the wife,
and of the husband as well, is found in the Social Welfare Law:
The husband, wife ... [etc.] of a recipient of public assistance or care
or of a person liable to become in need thereof shall, if of sufficient ability,
be responsible for the support of such person." 9
Only the most extreme misconduct has been held to relieve a spouse of
this obligation,m and it is even doubtful whether the statute supports
such cases. The cause of action belongs not to the spouse requiring sup-
port but to the officials responsible for granting public assistance; 121 the
property of persons liable may be seized, 2 and recovery for public grants
in the past may be had when a person liable or his estate, or the person
assisted or his estate, acquires property or is found to have had any.3
If one spouse is maintained other than on commitment as a criminal
by the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, which is prima-
rily responsible for the care and treatment of indigent persons who are
mentally ill, mentally defective, or epileptic, nevertheless, the other spouse
as well as named relatives, if able to do so, must pay for the cost of such
maintenance. 4 The Commissioner of Mental Hygiene has powers similar
to but not identical with or as broad as those of the public welfare officials
under the Social Welfare Law: the Commissioner may request the law
department of the state government to sue for the maintenance fur-
nished,2 5 he himself may institute a criminal proceeding against the spouse
or relative,'2( or he may discharge the patient if that will not be contrary
to the public interest. Suit is authorized where property is discovered
later as well as suit against the estate of a person who is liable.
Other provisions of the Mental Hygiene Law establish the obligation
of a spouse of a mentally-ill person to "cause him or her to be properly
and suitably cared for and maintained,'2 7 and specified public officials
may inquire into the support being furnished and commit the patient to
a state hospital if necessary. The statute implies that the spouse or rela-
tive must support the patient outside of a state institution if the public
119 N.Y. Soc. Wel. Law § 101.
120 Matter of Garrison, 171 Misc. 893, 14 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Columbia County Ct. 1939)
(needy husband had abandoned wife 23 years before); Hough v. Hough, 159 Misc. 894,
289 N.Y. Supp. 27 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. Manhattan 1936) (Needy wife guilty of prostitution,
bad contracted venereal disease, been convicted of bigamy).
121 N.Y. Soc. Wel. Law § 102.
122 Id. § 103.
123 Id. § 104.
124 N.Y. Ment. Hy. Law § 24(2).
125 Id. §§ 24(3)-(8).
126 See N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 926-c.
127 N.Y. Ment. Hy. Law § 80. See also id. § 79.
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safety permits,12 and machinery exists to compel support where the
patient is placed with another family by the authorities.
The obligation of a spouse as well as of relatives for the maintenance of
a mentally defective spouse is provided for specifically by additional legis-
lation'29 but in this case again there is no machinery for enforcing the
obligation as far as maintenance outside of the state institution in the
home of the person liable is concerned.
The Code of Criminal Procedure establishes the procedure whereby
the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene can force a spouse or relative of a
patient to pay for or contribute toward his maintenance either in a state
institution or in a private family where he has been placed for room and
board by the public authorities.13 -The Commissioner may file a petition
in a county court or its equivalent for a support order running against
the person liable; if the order is granted, the court may require a bond
for payment of the amount due from time to time; a judgment for
amounts already due is enforceable like any civil judgment and in addition
the person liable who fails to pay may be punished for contempt or found
guilty of a misdemeanor.
Criminal and civil sanctions are also provided by the Code of Criminal
Procedure to compel the support of poor persons by spouses or rela-
tives,131 supplementary to the purely civil remedies of the Social Welfare
Law. The public welfare authorities may apply to a number of named
courts for a support order against the spouse or relative.
A husband who abandons his wife, leaving her a public charge, may
have his property seized and sold by order of a magistrate on application
of the welfare authorities." 2 Still another criminal sanction to compel
support is found in the proceedings respecting disorderly persons. 3
Among the various types of disorderly persons named in the statute are
those who
. . . actually abandon their wives . . . without adequate support, or leave
them in danger of becoming a burden upon the public, or who neglect to
provide for them according to their means . . . and persons who threaten
to run away and leave their wives or children a burden upon the
public .... 134
If found to be a disorderly person of this kind, the neglectful husband
can be required to give security that he will furnish support to his wife,
128 See Ops. N.Y. Att'y Gen. 37 (1912).
129 N.Y. Ment. Hy. Law §§ 128, 129.
130 N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. pt. VI, fit. 8-A.
131 Id. §§ 921, 925.
132 Ibid.
133 Id. pt. VI, tit. 7.
'34 Id. §§ S99(1),(2).
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payable through the public welfare authorities.1 35 If the undertaking is
not given, the husband can be convicted of disorderly conduct and sen-
tenced to jail for as much as six months or placed on probation and
required to pay for his wife's support through the probation officer. 136 If
the security is forfeited, the husband may be jailed and the security goes
to the wife.13
7
New York has adopted what is known as the Uniform Support of
Dependents Law, 3 ' reciprocal legislation adopted by five other states and
the Virgin Islands, and "sufficiently similar to the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act to permit reciprocity"' 39 with the sixteen
states and Puerto Rico, which have adopted the latter act. The purpose
of both acts is to secure support in civil proceedings for wives, children,
and, in New York by a recent amendment,1 39a any dependent person
where the individual responsible for support is in a different state from
that of the dependent. The standard of support established for the person
liable is a ". . . fair and reasonable sum according to his means. ... ""I
or ". .. such sum as the court shall determine, having due regard to the
parties' means and circumstances."' 41 The purpose of the legislation is
to make more effective the enforcement of the obligation of the husband
to support his wife and children which has not been easy where the
husband moves to another state.
With some attention to the need of wives for support three different
courts of limited jurisdiction have been set up in New York and to some
extent they have been specially staffed to that end: the Domestic Rela-
tions Court, Family Division, in New York City only; the children's
court in most of the rest of the counties in the state, and the old Chil-
dren's Courts of Chautauqua and Ontario Counties. A Family Part of
the Supreme Court has recently been established in New York City to
concentrate the domestic relations matters brought in this court of general
jurisdiction. Two scholarly studies and the report of the Temporary
Commission on the Courts of the State of New York, as well as other
135 Id. § 901.
136 Id. § 902.
137 Id. § 906.
138 N.Y. Unconsol. Laws §§ 2111-20.
139 9A Uniform Laws Annotated 58 (Supp. 1954). See N.Y., Fifteenth Annual Report of
the Judicial Council 22 (1929); Note, "Uniform Support of Dependents Law," 16 Brooklyn
L. Rev. 104 (1949); Sager, "New York Uniform Support of Dependents Law," 1 Syracuse
L. Rev. 300 (1949); Note, "Uniform Support of Dependents Law," 24 St. John's L. Rev.
162 (1949).
139a N.Y. Laws 1955, c. 289.
140 N.Y. UnconsoL Laws § 2113(a).
'4' Id. § 2116(k).
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comment, have agreed upon the necessity of adequate judicial machinery
for dealing with the specialized problems of domestic relations, including
support for wives. 1
42
The three different domestic relations courts now in existence have been
established by separate legislative enactments; the Domestic Relations
Court Act of New York City, which codified a series of enactments begin-
ning with the New York City Charter of 1898,143 and the Children's Court
Act of 1922' for the counties outside of New York City, except for
Ontario and Chautauqua Counties which retain children's courts estab-
lished prior to the statewide system.145
Both the children's courts in the counties outside of New York City
and the Domestic Relations Court of New York City are courts of limited
jurisdiction and the New York Constitution further limits their potential
jurisdiction to that possessed by the county courts. 46 These children's
courts are not courts of record, 47 which raises certain possible problems
with respect to recognition of their judgments in other states, but which
also excludes them from the procedural nightmares of the New York Civil
Practice Act, a complicated and rigid procedural system.
Support proceedings in the children's court are governed by article
III-A of the Children's Court Act; in the domestic relations court by
title III of the Domestic Relations Court Act, which establishes the
Family Court Division of the Domestic Relations Court of New York
City. In some important respects the powers of the two courts, New
York City and upstate, are not the same. Thus the children's court in
each county has jurisdiction each within its own county,148 whereas the
domestic relations court in New York City has jurisdiction ". . . within
the city," comprising five counties,'49 but the process of both extends to
the entire state. The support of a wife is within the jurisdiction of the
142 See Kahn, A Court for Children (1953), and Dean, Book Review, 39 Cornell L.Q. 778
(1954) ; Gellhorn, Children and Families in the Courts of New York City (1954) ; Loeb, "A
Proposal for a Simplified Court Structure [by the Temporary Commission on the Courts],"
27 N.Y.S. Bar Bull. 266 (1955); Lukas, "New York City Children's Court and Cognate
Matters," 3 Record of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York 331 (1948); Lynn,
"The Children's Court of the City of New York," 3 Record 60 (1948); Notes, 3 Record
346 (1948), 36 Cornell L.Q. 156 (1950).
143 N.Y. Crim. Code (Domestic Relations Court Act), hereafter cited as "N.Y. Dom. Rel.
Court Act."
144 N.Y. Crim. Code (Children's Court Act), hereafter cited as "N.Y. Child. Court Act."
145 N.Y. Laws 1913, c. 269; N.Y. Laws 1918, c. 464; N.Y. Child. Court Act § 1, 46.
146 N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 18.
147 N.Y. Judic. Law § 2(10).
148 N.Y. Child. Court Act § 30(1).
149 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Court Act § 91(1).
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children's courts upstate only if she is pregnant or has a child or step-
child requiring support,"' but the domestic relations court may enter-
tain support proceedings for a wife alone; 151 even a wife may be compelled
by the domestic relations court to support her husband if he is likely
to become a public charge.' 52 Both courts are empowered to order
support for a "wife and child" (children's court)15 1 or a "wife or child"
(domestic relations court), irrespective of whether either is likely
to become a public charge and having due regard for the circumstances
of the respective parties. Neither court is limited in the judgments it may
render for the support of wives to that necessary to prevent destitution.
Both courts have ample powers to insure compliance with support
orders, such as power to require security by written undertaking for the
payment of sums ordered, or in lieu of an undertaking, to suspend sen-
tence and place on probation one who has failed to support a dependent
as ordered. While the children's court can commit to jail for a maximum
of six months at a time a person who fails to obey its orders, 55 the
Domestic Relations Court of New York City can commit for a maximum
of twelve months. 5 ' In giving both courts broad powers to alter support
orders, including cancelling or reducing arrears, the legislature has
severely limited the recognition the judgments of these courts can obtain
in other states. Both courts have full power to punish civil and criminal
contempts.'5 7
Residential jurisdiction of both courts is founded upon residence or
domicile in the county or city, respectively, where the petition for support
is filed, or merely on the presence of the individual liable when the person
for whom support is sought is domiciled or residing there. The Children's
Court Act goes on to extend jurisdiction to order a person found in the
county to support a pregnant wife, wherever she may be, and to exercise
jurisdiction wherever the person liable may be, if he and the person seek-
ing support were either domiciled or residing in the county when the
failure to support occurred.'55  The domestic relations court, on the
other hand, extends no privileges to pregnant women and, in reference
to absent persons who are domiciled or residing in the city along with
the persons seeking support-wife and children-at the time the failure
150 N.Y. Child. Court Act § 30(1).
151 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Court Act § 91(1).
152 Id. §§ 92(6-a), 92(a).
153 N.Y. Child. Court Act § 30-a(1).
154 N.Y. Doam. Rel. Court Act § 92(1).
155 N.Y. Child. Court Act § 30-a(11).
156 N.Y. Doam. Re. Court Act § 31-b(c).
157 Id. § 57; N.Y. Child. Court Act H5 12, 30-a(20).
158 N.Y. Child. Court Act § 31-b(c).
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to support occurred, there is an added requirement that the person seeking
support must be domiciled or residing in the city when the petition is
filed.1 5
9
Both courts have similar powers to issue warrants for arrest under
specified conditions. 60 Each has power to reach salary and pension pay-
ments due to a person failing to obey a support order, where such person
is employed by the county or city authorities. Both courts may issue
writs of seizure of property of a person who has failed to obey a support
order, where he has left or threatens to leave the jurisdiction of the court;
under appropriate circumstances such a writ may even precede the
issuance of a support order. 6' Provisions in both acts cover bonds for
persons with suspended sentences and bonds to insure the appearance of
persons released on bail. There are some minor variations with respect
to undertakings for support in the two courts.
The statutes governing each of the two courts contain an important
section governing the effect of divorces, separations, and annulments,'62
and although these were amended only three years apart, they are not
uniform. The Children's Court Act'63 states that when a divorce, separa-
tion, or annulment has been granted by the supreme court, the court of
general jurisdiction, or a suit is pending and alimony or maintenance has
been granted, a petition can nevertheless be filed in the children's court
for support, provided the person liable is not already in jail for failure
to obey an order of the supreme court. No greater sum can be sought
in the children's court than may have been granted previously in the
supreme court, however. If the petitioner is likely to become a public
charge, a pending action in the supreme court is no bar to a suit in the
children's court. Even if alimony be denied in the supreme court in
a separation action, support can be ordered by the children's court if
the dependent is likely to become a public charge.
Unaccountably, the corresponding provision of the Domestic Relations
Court Act is different in important respects. In the first place if the
marriage relationship has been terminated by the supreme court "or
by judgment of any other court of competent jurisdiction, when valid in
the state of New York,"' 64 support is available only for a child and
not for the wife in the domestic relations court. If a separation has
been granted by the supreme court or an action for divorce, separation,
159 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Court Act § 103 (1) (c).
160 N.Y. Child. Court Act § 32-a; N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. Act § 123.
161 Id. §§ 33-e, 123; N.Y. Doam. Rel. Court Act § 133.
102 N.Y. Child. Court Act § 33-i; N.Y. Dom. Rel. Court Act § 137.
163 N.Y. Child. Court Act § 33-1.
164 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Court Act § 137(1).
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annulment, or dissolution of the marriage is pending and a support order
has been entered in such action, a petition for support consistent with the
supreme court order can be filed in the domestic relations court if the
supreme court order has not been obeyed and the other party is not
already in jail as a result. Failure to grant alimony in the supreme court
will not preclude an order for support of a child or for a wife who is likely
to become a public charge.
The Children's Courts of Chautauqua and Ontario Counties were estab-
lished prior to the passage of the Children's and Domestic Relations Court
Acts and, as already mentioned, were expressly excluded from their scope.
The Children's Court of Ontario County is governed by a statute passed
in 1913,165 and the only provision it contains with respect to support deals
with the expenses of children committed to institutions. The Chautauqua
County Children's Court was constituted in 1918,166 and contains no
provisions regarding support. A search of the Consolidated Laws and
the Session Laws of New York State has not revealed any amendments
to either act regarding support for wives, so in these two counties these
specialized courts are without the powers of the corresponding courts in
New York City and in the other upstate counties.
It sometimes happens that a husband and wife, though living together,
enter into an agreement regarding the support of the wife, which is to be
distinguished from a separation agreement whereby the parties agree to
live apart and also includes provision for the support of the wife. If the
support agreement purports to relieve the husband of his obligation to
support his wife, it is clearly unenforceable, 167 although if it has been
executed the courts will not interfere. 6 Even where the agreement
obligates the husband to pay a given amount of money at periodic inter-
vals and the wife agrees to accept that amount as sufficient for her
sulAlort, the wife's action to collect an installment has been dismissed.1 9
If the husband pays the wife a lump sum for her maintenance for the rest
of her life, the same will be true, and in any case the husband will always
retain responsibility if his wife becomes a public charge.
In a category by itself is a rule that a transfer of property by a husband
who, in anticipation of marriage and in order to defraud his prospective
wife, disposes of it in such a way that he continues to enjoy it for his
lifetime but on his death it goes to a third party, may be set aside on suit
by the wife.'
165 N.Y. Laws 1913, cs. 269, 270.
166 N.Y. Laws 1918, c. 464.
167 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 51.
168 Dworkin v. Dworkin, 247 App. Div. 213, 286 N.Y. Supp. 982 (Ist Dep't 1936).
169 Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y. 337, 18 N.E.2d 521 (1939).
170 Rubin v. Mynart Realty Co., 244 App. Div. 541, 279 N.Y. Supp. 867 (1st Dep't 1935).
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Mention has already been made of the liability a neglectful husband
may incur to third parties who furnish necessaries to his wife. In addition
the husband must pay her funeral expenses but only if she does not leave
any estate from which they can be paid.
1 7 1
Liability After Change in Marital Status 72
In the previous pages the discussion was limited to the maintenance
obligations of spouses where their matrimonial status has remained
unaltered in a legal sense, except that some of the explanation of the
children's and domestic relations courts dealt with wives who had been
separated or divorced. If the parties to a marriage have themselves
entered into a separation agreement with support provisions, relieving
both of them of the marital obligation of cohabitation, their marital status
has been altered. This will also be true where the parties are living apart
pursuant to a court order, or where they have been divorced.
There is no public policy in New York against a husband and wife
agreeing to live apart and defining their remaining obligations by a con-
tract known as a separation agreement .'7  There is no longer any neces-
sity, as there was at common law, for the agreement to be entered into
with a third party as trustee for the wife's interest, since the wife is now
empowered to contract directly with her husband. 74 Of course, as already
pointed out, a separation agreement purporting to relieve a husband of
any obligation to support his wife would be unenforceable, but if the
husband has fairly informed the wife as to his property and income and
she has had an opportunity to obtain disinterested advice, an agreement
under which the wife receives support on a reasonable relationship with
the standard of living the husband enjoys will be upheld in the courts.
For example, a separation agreement whereby the wife was to receive
one-fourth of the husband's income was approved, 75 but at the %'er
extreme 36 cents a day for the wife was found to be unreasonable. 6
171 N.Y. Surr. Court Act § 216.
172 On the law generally see Keezer, Law of Marriage and Divorce cs. 17, 36-41 (3d ed.
1946); Long, Domestic Relations §§ 214, 238, 247; Madden, Domestic Relations §§ 97-99;
1 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment c. 12; 2 id. cs. 13, 14, 16, 17; 3 id. cs. 29, 32 (2d ed.
1945) ; Peck, Domestic Relations § 93; 1 Schouler, Domestic Relations §§ 1069, 1070; 2 id.
cs. 2, 28-38; 2 Vernier, American Family Laws §§ 96-111, 128, 129, 132-35, 139, 140, 147.
The New York law is discussed in Battershall, Domestic Relations c. VIII; Bullock, Husband
and Wife §§ 28ga-305; Grossman, Domestic Relations cs. 21-23.
173 See Lindey, Separation Agreements and Ante-Nuptial Contracts (1937); Feld,
"AppraisAl of the Separation Agreement-in New York," 15 Brooklyn L. Rev. 210 (1949)
Roberts, "Validity and Utility of Separation Agreements in New York Law," 16 St. John's
L. Rev. 185 (1942).
174 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 51.
175 Sears v. Sears, 259 App. Div. 11i3, 21 N.Y.S.2d 278 (3d Dep't 1940).
176 Kloek v. Kloek, 54 N.Y.S.2d 543 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1045).
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If the agreement was fairly negotiated and the wife is receiving reason-
able support either in periodic payments or after an ample lump sum
payment, the agreement cannot be modified merely because one party
wishes to do so. The agreement itself may provide for the effect a matri-
monial judgment will have upon it, although a separation agreement call-
ing for the institution of divorce proceedings by either party will be void
as against public policy. If a matrimonial action is instituted by a wife
in which she applies for alimony, her application will constitute a rescis-
sion of the support provision of the separation agreement.
If a divorce is granted in proceedings in which both parties participate
or in a state in which the adversary was personally served, the separation
agreement will be terminated unless it specifically provides for obligations
to survive that event. Since it is possible in the United States for one
spouse to obtain in an ex parte proceeding a divorce which must be recog-
nized in all of the states, 77 a special problem arises after a divorce. The
Supreme Court of the United States has developed the doctrine that an
ex parte dissolution of the marriage need not terminate the obligation to
support where the applicable state law lays down such a continuing
obligation,""8 so it would seem that under such circumstances a valid
separation agreement would continue to be enforceable in New York
against the former husband.
The Civil Practice Act defines the wife's cause of action for a separation
in these terms:
* * . an action may be maintained . . . to procure a judgment separat-
ing the parties from bed and board, forever, or for a limited time, for any
of the following causes:
4. Where the wife is plaintiff, the neglect or refusal of the defendant to
provide for her.179
If the wife is successful, the court may order the defendant to provide
for her ". . . having regard to the circumstances of the respective
parties. .... M80
The action of separation is available only where both parties are resi-
dents of New York State or where they were married in the state and one
party is a resident or where they were married elsewhere and one party
has been a resident for at least one year. 81
In New York there is, of course, only one ground for divorce:
177 William v. North Carolina, 317 US. 287 (1942).
178 Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
179 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1161.
180 Id. § 1164.
181 Id. § 1166-a.
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adultery.' Jurisdiction to grant a divorce is similar to, but not identical
with, that for granting a separation: where both parties were New York
residents when the adultery was committed, where the parties were mar-
ried in New York even though neither is presently domiciled in New York,
where the plaintiff was a New York resident when the offense was com-
mitted and when the action is commenced, or when the offense was
committed in New York and the injured party resided in New York when
the action is commenced.' Power is given to the court in the final judg-
ment in a divorce action brought by the wife to:
... require the defendant to provide suitably . . for the support of
plaintiff, as justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the
respective parties; and ...to annul, vary or modify such a direction.' 84
The inequality of the sexes is preserved in that New York courts lack
jurisdiction to award support to the husband in a matrimonial action,
whatever the circumstances may be.
Special attention is given to the property rights of the successful
plaintiff-wife:
If ...the plaintiff [wife] is the owner of any real property, or has in
her possession or under her control any personal property or thing in action
which was left with her by the defendant or acquired by her own industry
or given her by bequest or otherwise, or if she is or thereafter may become
entitled to any property by the decease of a relative intestate, the defendant
shall not have any interest therein, absolute or contingent, before or after
her death.' 85
Whatever the sex of a successful plaintiff in a divorce action, the
defendant loses any interest in, life insurance policies on the plaintiff's
life in which the defendant was a named beneficiary, although any pre-
miums paid by the defendant on the policy will be taken into account. 86
Annulment represents another type of alteration of marital status and
under annulment will be considered actions of annulment and actions
to declare the nullity of a void marriage based variously on specified
grounds'8 7 in which "the court may give such direction for support
of the wife by the husband as justice requires"' 88 contrary to the
practice in most of the other states. Jurisdiction to annul a marriage is
identical with jurisdiction to grant a separation, discussed above. 89
182 Id. § 1147.
183 Ibid.
184 Id. § 1155.
185 Id. § 1156.
186 Id. § 1160.
187 Id. §§ 1132-34; 1136-39; 1141.
188 Id. § 1140-a.
189 See note 181 supra.
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Provision is also made for dissolution of marriage on the ground of the
absence of a spouse for five years without any trace of the missing spouse,
the Enoch Arden situation, but no authority is given to the court granting
the dissolution over any property left by the absent spouse.
Under another statute, imprisonment of one spouse for life permits the
other to remarry9 ° but, whether the other remarries or not, the impris-
oned spouse loses all rights to the estate of the other spouse unless
included by will.'91
In an action for divorce, separation, or annulment the court may require
the husband to pay the wife's litigation expense and "for the support
of the wife, having regards to the circumstances of the respective parties,"
and a wife defending an annulment action after the death of her husband
may be awarded suit money also.'92 A wife attacking either as plaintiff
or defendant an out-of-state divorce decree granted in proceedings in
which she did not appear may also be awarded litigation expense. 9'
Where the wife is plaintiff in an action for separation or divorce, tem-
porary and permanent alimony may be awarded to her.'94
Support of the wife is deeply involved in one of the most troublesome
legal problems in the United States, that of migratory divorce. The
problem is illustrated by such a typical fact-pattern as this: the husband
and wife live in New York and become estranged. The strictness of the
divorce law in New York makes a divorce there impossible, so the husband
goes to Nevada, where a six weeks residence evidences domiciliary intent
and divorce requirements are liberal. He files suit for divorce; his wife
may be served personally or by publication in New York and she may
choose not to appear in Nevada. On these facts the United States
Supreme Court has held'95 that, if the husband established a bona fide
domicile in Nevada, his ex parte divorce must be accorded full faith and
credit in all of the other states under the United States Constitution.'96
If the wife, however, at the initial estrangement had filed a separation
action in New York, obtained service of process on her husband in New
York and had been granted a separation with alimony, the United States
190 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 7-a.
191 Matter of Lindewall, 287 N.Y. 347, 39 N.E.2d 907 (1942).
192 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1169.
193 Id. § 1169-a.
194 Id. § 1170. Cf. id. § 1164, covering permanent alimony in separation actions alone.
Powerful sanctions are available to assist the wife to enforce the right to support in matri-
monial actions: under various conditions the husband may be required to post security, his
property may be sequestered, execution may be had on a judgment for sums of money due,
and contempt proceedings may result in fine or imprisonment. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1171-73.
195 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
196 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
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Supreme Court has held that if the local law provides that alimony in a
separation action survives an ex parte divorce, the wife will continue to
receive her alimony even though the Nevada decree has ended the
marriage of the parties.19 7
The next step in New York, where the law was taken to mean that
alimony provisions of a separation order survive a divorce decree, was
to provide that even after an ex parte divorce a wife in New York can
obtain alimony in a new proceeding although she cannot successfully
attack the out-of-state divorce decree. 9"
5. Succession to Property as Between Husband and Wife"9
The law of succession in New York is unusually complex; there is a
great deal of litigation. Each county has one or more surrogates whose
decisions are published which, with the opinions in appellate tribunals,
has produced a staggering volume of reported cases. There are elaborate
treatises on the New York law of succession as well as briefer discussions
in texts on domestic relations;s ° articles on New York law appear
frequently in legal periodicals. 0 ' The legislature is constantly amending
the Decedent Estate Law and the Surrogate's Court Act. Under these
circumstances it is necessary to condense ruthlessly in order to summarize
even so limited an area of succession as the rights of a surviving spouse.
The initial right of a surviving spouse is to obtain letters of administra-
tion on the estate of a spouse dying intestate, leaving personal property,20 2
but this right will be lost if the surviving spouse abandoned or, if a
197 Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
198 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1170-b. The same power in the wife exists after an ex parte
annulment, "ex parte" meaning in this case an action in which the wife was not served per-
sonally within the state granting the decree. The statute was recommended by the N.Y.
State Law Revision Commission; see the study by the present writer: N.Y. Leg. Doc. No.
65(K) (1953). Applied in Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 147 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1st Dep't 1955).
199 On the law generally see Long, Domestic Relations § 127; Peck, Domestic Relations
c. 14; 3 Vernier, American Family Laws §§ 170, 188-223, 227. Among the useful treatises
devoted exclusively to wills and administration are Atkinson, Wills and Administration
(2d ed. 1954) ; Page, A Treatise on the Law of Wills and Administration (1924) ; Thompson,
Wills (3d ed. 1947).
200 On the New York law see Battershall, Domestic Relations cs. 11, 12; Bullock, Husband
and Wife cs. 24, 25. See also Beechler, Elections Against Wills: Section 18, Decedent Estate
Law of New York (1940): Davids, New York Law of Wills (1924); Central Hanover Bank
and Trust Co., Laws Affecting New York Decedents' Estates (2d ed. 1949).
201 Each year there are articles on Succession, Future Interests, andTrusts and Adminis-
tration in the Survey of New York Law, published as the December issue of the New York
University Law Review. See also Note, "New Methods for Creating a 'Poor Man's' Will
in New York," 53 Colum. L. Rev. 132 (1953); Note, "Illusory Transfers, etc.," 1 N.Y.LS.
Student L. Rev. 77 (1952).
202 N.Y. Surr. Court Act §§ 87, 118.
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husband, failed to support the decedent. Not only will a divorce bar the
right of administration but so will an invalid divorce decree obtained
outside of New York.2° Ordinarily a separation judgment will not bar
this right, provided the judgment was not granted for abandonment; other
judgments, such as one by the domestic relations court for non-support,
may bar the right even though not adjudications of "abandonment. '20 4
A separation agreement may bar the right if it granted the surviving
spouse some consideration for a release of claims to the decedent's estate.,
The Decedent Estate Law provides rules for intestate succession in New
York which give one-third of the real and personal property, after pay-
ment of all debts, to the surviving spouse, the rest to any descendants.
If there are no descendants, but both of the decedent's parents survive,
the spouse takes $5,000 and one-half of the residue, while the parents
divide the other half of the residue. If one parent survives but no
descendants, again the surviving spouse takes $5,000 and divides the
residue with the parent. If there are no brothers or sisters, nephews or
nieces, the surviving spouse takes the whole estate but, if any of the
foregoing survive, the spouse takes $10,000 and one-half of the residue
with the remainder going to the other survivors.0 5
No intestate share, however, goes to a former spouse validly divorced
from the decedent:
.or to a spouse who has procured without the state of New York a
final decree or judgment dissolving the marriage with the decedent, where
such decree or judgment is not recognized as valid by the law of this
state .... 20
or to a husband who has neglected to provide for his wife or to a spouse
who had abandoned the decedent.
There are no limitations in New York on the power of a married woman
to bequeath and inherit real and personal property; the law gives the
power to make a will to all adults of sound mind.2V 7
To protect a surviving spouse and specified relatives no more than one-
half of a decedent's estate may be willed for a charitable or similar pur-
pose and if a will purports to do so, the surviving spouse may claim the
partial invalidity of the will.2 °0
203 Id. § 87; N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 87. The right to letters depends upon the right to
share in the distribution of the decedent's personal property which is barred by the latter
statute as far as a spouse who obtained an invalid decree is concerned.
204 Matter of Rechtschaffen, 278 N.Y. 336, 16 N.E.2d 357 (1938).
205 N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 83.
206 Id. § 87. A surviving spouse who obtained a void Mexican divorce by mail has been
barred from an intestate share under this rule. In re Rathscheck's Estate, 192 Misc. 446, 80
N.Y.S.2d 622 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1948).
207 N.Y. Dec. Est. Law §§ 12, 15.
208 Id. § 17.
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Where a will was made prior to September 1, 1930, and the testator
subsequently married and. left a surviving spouse, the will is deemed
revoked unless the spouse is provided for by an antenuptial agreement.20 9
A surviving spouse of a testator who made a will and died after that date
has a personal right to take an intestate share, as will be explained below.
If a husband and wife are separated or divorced or their marriage is
annulled and yet the other party is named personally in the decedent's
will by name, the survivor will take"0 unless in a separation agreement
the survivor had renounced any share in the decedent's estate.2 11
A good deal of complexity surrounds the right of the surviving spouse
to elect an intestate share in place of taking under the will.2" The present
provisions of the law were enacted to extend protection to surviving
spouses in lieu of dower and curtesy, which were prospectively abolished
as will be explained below. The ingenuity of counsel in developing trust
devices to circumvent the elective share accounts for much of the trouble.
The condition giving rise to an election is the death of the decedent
after August 31, 1930, leaving a will executed after that date, If the
surviving spouse elects to take an intestate share rather than whatever
was given in the will, the most that can be obtained is one-half- of the
net estate. If the intestate share is over $2,500 and the testator has left
in trust or under a similar arrangement an equivalent or larger amount
with the income payable to the surviving spouse for life, the latter may
take $2,500 which shall be deducted from the principal of the trust.
Where the intestate share is no more than $2,500 the surviving spouse
may elect to take that sum rather than to take under the will,
If the will leaves the surviving spouse $2,500 or more and also a life
interest in a trust with a principal as large as the difference between the
intestate share and the devise, there is no right of election.
Should less than $2,500 and a life interest in a trust equal to the excess
between the devise and the intestate share be left by will for the spouse,
the election is limited to $2,500; and the difference between the devise
and $2,500 shall be deducted from the principal of the trust.
Where all provisions under the will give a total less than the intestate
share, the ipouse can take the difference between the total and the
intestate share in addition to taking under the will.
209 Id. § 35.
210 Matter of De Nardo, 268 App. Div-865, 50 N.Y.S.2d 561 (2d Dep't 1944).
211 Matter of Wallace, 184 Misc. 448, 56 N.Y.S.2d 43 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1944), aff'd,
268 App. Div. 1029, 52 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1st Dep't 1945).
212 N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 18. See Broughton, '4Amendment to the Decedent Estate Law
Clarifying Waiver of the Spouse's Right of Election Against a Will," 22 St. John's L. Rev.
170 (1947) ; Vaughan, Address, 65 N.Y.S. Bar Ass'n Rep. 70 (1942).
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In every case the spouse can take $2,500 from the will or from the
trust fund, if the intestate share is that much, and that sum will be
deducted from any devise.
Much litigation has arisen under the elective share law, which has had
the effect of limiting the surviving spouse's share to less than granted
by the system of dower and curtesy. A recent case limited the scope
of "estate" as used in the elective share statute so that savings accounts
in trust for a daughter were excluded from the estate, and a widow named
in the will as sole beneficiary could only elect to take against an "estate"
which would not include the trust.21 3 That such savings accounts in
trust would be illusory as against the widow's claim was denied.214
The occasion for enacting the elective share law was the outright
abolition of curtesy and the prospective abolition in New York of
dower. 15 As the law stands, however, where the two parties were married
prior to September 1, 1930, the widow still is entitled to one-third of all
real property in which the husband had an inheritable interest at any
time during the marriage.21 '6 There are enough wives still possessing an
inchoate right of dower to make it worthwhile to outline the incidents of
this estate in New York.
Of course the wife must survive the husband if the inchoate right of
dower is to ripen into an estate. She may relinquish the right by joining
with the husband in a conveyance of real property or by executing a
release.217 Since the inchoate right of dower is established as soon as the
husband is seized of real property, it is not lost with respect to property
acquired during a marriage by a divorce obtained by the wife. A statute,
however, denies dower to a wife against whom a divorce is granted for her
misconduct. 218 An annulment or a dissolution of a marriage because of
five years' unexplained absence by the wife cuts off dower.
Even where the wife is still entitled to dower, she may elect between
dower and any provision made in its place by will.2 1 9 If a devise in the
will is not specifically in lieu of dower, she may take both dower and
devise. If a widow of a decedent dying intestate elects to take her intes-
tate share of his real property, she must relinquish her dower interest.220
A widow entitled to dower has also the right of quarantine, permitting
213 Matter of Halpern, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951). See Note, "-Aftermath of
Halpern-," 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 306 (1952).
214 Apparently reversing Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
215 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 189.
218 Id. § 190.
217 Witthaus v. Schack, 105 N.Y. 332, 11 N.E. 649 (1887).
218 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 196.
219 Id. §§ 199-201.
220 N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 82.
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her to remain for forty days in the home of the deceased husband with her
upkeep provided from his estate.221
To protect not merely the surviving spouse but also any children,
statutes provide certain exemptions for the decedent's estate from the
claims of creditors.22 In the light of current prices as well as the increas-
ingly urban life in New York State these exemptions have an archaic
ring; in specific articles, $1,000 worth of furniture and the clothing of
decedent are exempt; $50 worth of books and the family Bible, farm
animals and machinery to the value of $450, and $300 in cash or personal
property. These items belong to the surviving spouse, or to the children
if no spouse survives. Since a surviving spouse who had abandoned the
decedent is unable to take an intestate share, such a spouse is barred
from taking under the exemption provision.
A cause of action for the wrongful death of the decedent is given to
the executor or administrator where the spouse or next of kin survive.2 3
Included in any recovery will be the reasonable funeral expense paid by
the spouse or next of kin.224 If only a spouse survives, the entire recovery
after funeral expenses goes to the spouse, but nothing can go to a husband
who did not provide for the deceased wife or to any spouse who had
abandoned the decedent.22 5
6. Pension Rights
Civil service employees of the State of New York are covered by a
series of actuarial retirement plans, most of them by the New York State
Employees' Retirement System.228 It includes retirement benefits for
both old age and disability with benefits payable to the widow of the
assured.
The local government employees in some cases are covered by a state
pension plan; the teachers in all public schools have a separate, state-
wide retirement system, and the counties and municipalities have one or
more retirement plans, some of them, such as a series for New York City,
of vast scope and involving millions of dollars. All of these plans provide
for death benefits of various amounts to surviving widows of persons
covered.
In addition to the coverage of the public plans in New York State,
221 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 204.
222 N.Y. Surr. Court Act §§ 200 et seq.
223 N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 130.
224 Id. § 132.
225 Id. § 133.
228 N.Y. Civ. S. Law pt. 4.
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not to mention various pension systems which are federally sponsored 27
an undetermined number of state residents are beneficiaries of various
private pension plans, many of them established after the war in response
to the demands of organized labor; these private plans provide benefits
for surviving widows.
7. Workmen's Compensation22 s
New York has a statewide workmen's compensation system to protect
employees and their dependent survivors from losses due to injury or
accidental death while working for New York employers 2 The system
is actuarial in principle and the employers may either purchase insurance
against liability to their employees from commercial carriers or from a
state insurance fund. Awards to injured workers or to their survivors
are made by the Workmen's Compensation Board, an administrative body,
with appeal available to the Appellate Division, Third Department.
In the case of accidental death in the scope of employment reasonable
funeral expenses up to $400 are paid. In addition, benefits are payable
to a surviving wife or dependent husband as well as to other surviving
dependents 3 0
IV
CONCLUSION
It may be concluded that vast strides have been taken in New York
to remove the economic inequality between husband and wife. Yet some
questions can properly be raised as to the effectiveness of the implement-
ing legislation; and some fragments of medieval law survive.
It has already been suggested, 31 for example, that the estate by the
entirety is an archaic relic of the common-law unity of husband and wife,
which has no place in the modem world where husband and wife are
distinct legal persons.
Another example of outmoded legislation is the New York version of
the homestead laws.2 2 If the family home requires protection by statute
from the claims of creditors, such protection is certainly not afforded by
the $1,000 maximum presently allowed. No wife or children in New York
227 In addition to the broad coverage of the Social Security Act there are various other
pension systems, ranging from different ones for the various armed services to those for
federal employees.
228 The best study of workmen's compensation is Larson, The Law of Workmen's
Compensation (1952).
229 N.Y. Work. Comp. Law.
230 Id. § 16.
231 See note 32 supra.
232 See note 40 supra.
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today will be safeguarded by this neglected legislation. The same is true
of the statute purporting to protect certain essential articles of personal
property from creditors,2 33 and the corresponding legislation for trivial
exemptions of a decedent's estate from the claims of creditors. 3 4
Now that the right of the wife to her separate property is well estab-
lished in New York, the provision for dissolution of a trust for a married
woman3 5 is no longer necessary for the purpose for which it was passed
and is confusing in the light of the present development of the law of
trusts.
The rule of the Uniform Commercial Code, extending the seller's
warranty to persons in the household of the buyer who might reasonably
expect to be affected by the goods,23 6 is a rational restatement of the
clumsy judge-made contraption of the implied agency of the wife.
While it is probably true that there are sufficient remedies available
to a wife in New York to obtain support from her husband, they are
scattered over a series of unrelated civil and criminal statutes; much of
the substantive law of support is mingled with the procedural law in the
monstrous New York Civil Practice Act.237 The provisions for the support
of a wife in the Children's Court Act and Domestic Relations Court Act23
should be uniform throughout the state, and Ontario and Chautauqua
Counties should be incorporated into the State of New York in this
connection. A single court to administer these provisions is a natural
consequence of uniform rules of law.
Where one spouse becomes a ward of the state, whether because of
indigence, mental illness, mental defectiveness, or epilepsy, there should
be a single set of uniform rules requiring the other spouse to meet the
expense.239
The legislation providing for the spouse's elective share at the death
of the other spouse seems ready for careful legislative reexamination if
the original purpose of the innovation is to be preserved from judicial
onslaught.
233 See note 46 supra.
234 See note 222 supra.
235 See note 53 supra.
236 See note 91 supra.
237 See, in contrast, the flexible system of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey.
238 See notes 148 et seq. supra.
239 See notes 119, 124, 127, 129 supra.
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